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We study the equilibrium distribution of relative strategy scores of agents in the asymmetric phase
(α ≡ P/N & 1) of the basic Minority Game using sign-payoff, with N agents holding two strategies
over P histories. We formulate a statistical model that makes use of the gauge freedom with respect
to the ordering of an agent’s strategies to quantify the correlation between the attendance and the
distribution of strategies. The relative score x ∈ Z of the two strategies of an agent is described
in terms of a one dimensional random walk with asymmetric jump probabilities, leading either to
a static and asymmetric exponential distribution centered at x = 0 for fickle agents or to diffusion
with a positive or negative drift for frozen agents. In terms of scaled coordinates x/
√
N and t/N
the distributions are uniquely given by α and in quantitative agreement with direct simulations of
the game. As the model avoids the reformulation in terms of a constrained minimization problem it
can be used for arbitrary payoff functions with little calculational effort and provides a transparent
and simple formulation of the dynamics of the basic Minority Game in the asymmetric phase.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Fb, 05.40.-a, 89.65.Gh
I. INTRODUCTION
A minority game can be exemplified by the following
simple market analogy; An odd number N of traders
(agents) must at each time step choose between two op-
tions, buying or selling a share, with the aim of picking
the minority group. If sell is in minority and buy in
majority one may expect the price to go up to satisfy
demand and vice versa if buy is in minority, thus moti-
vating the minority character of the game. Clearly, there
is no way to make everyone content, at least half of the
agents will inevitably end up in the majority group each
round. As the losing agents will try to improve their lot
there is no static equilibrium. Instead, agents might be
expected to adapt their buy or sell strategies based on
perceived trends in the history of outcomes [1–11].
The Minority Game proposed by Zhang and Challet [2]
formalizes this type of market dynamics where agents of
limited intellect compete for a scarce resource by adapt-
ing to the aggregate input of all others [1, 11]. Each
agent has a set of strategies that, depending on the re-
cent past history of minority groups going m time steps
back, gives a prediction of the next minority being buy or
sell. The agent uses at each time step her highest scoring
strategy which has most accurately predicted correct mi-
nority groups historically. The state space of the game is
given by the strategy scores of each agent together with
the recent history of minority groups, and the discrete
time evolution in this space represents an intricate dy-
namical system.
What makes the game appealing from a physics per-
spective is that it can be described using methods for the
statistical physics of disordered systems, with the set of
randomly assigned strategies corresponding to quenched
disorder [4, 7, 12–14, 16]. In particular Challet, Marsili,
and co-workers showed that the model can be formulated
in terms of the gradient descent dynamics of an underly-
ing Hamiltonian [12], plus noise. The asymptotic dynam-
ics corresponds to minimizing the Hamiltonian with re-
spect to the frequency at which agents use each strategy,
a problem which in turn can be solved using the replica
method [7, 16, 17]. In a complementary development
Coolen solved the statistical dynamics of the problem in
its full complexity using generating functionals [13–15].
The game is controlled by the parameter α = P/N ,
where P = 2m is the number of distinct histories that
agents take into account, which tunes the system through
a phase transition (for N → ∞) at a critical value
αc = 0.3374.... In the symmetric (or crowded) phase,
α < αc, the game is quasi-periodic with period 2P where
a given history gives alternately one or the other of the
outcomes for minority group [3, 18]. A somewhat over-
simplified characterization of the dynamics is that the
information about the last winning minority group for
a given history gives a crowding effect [19] where many
agents want to repeat the last winning outcome which
then counterproductively instead puts them in the ma-
jority group. The crowding also gives large fluctuations
of the size of the minority group.
In the asymmetric (or dilute) phase, α > αc, agents
are sufficiently uncorrelated that crowding effects are not
important and there is no periodic behavior. Instead, as
exemplified in Figure 1 the score dynamics is random
but with a net correlation between agents that makes
fluctuations in the size of the minority group small. The
dilute occupation of the full strategy space gives rise to
a non-uniform frequency distribution of histories which
can be beneficial for agents with strategies that are tuned
to this asymmetry.
In this paper we study the dynamics of the Minor-
ity Game in the asymmetric phase by formulating a
simplified statistical model, focusing on finding proba-
bility distributions for the relative strategy scores. In
particular, we study the original formulation of the
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2game with sign-payoff for which quantitative results are
challenging to derive. By sorting the strategies based
on how strongly they are correlated with the average
over all strategies in the game, we find that sufficient
statistical information can be extracted to formulate a
quantitatively accurate model for α & 1. We discuss
how the relative score for each agent can be derived
from the master equation of a random walk on a chain
with asymmetric jump probabilities to nearest neighbor
sites, and how these jump probabilities can be calculated
from the basic dynamic update equation of the scores.
The corresponding probability distributions of scores are
either of the form of exponential localization or diffusion
with a drift. In the appendices we show that the model
is related to but independent from the Hamiltonian
formulation and we show how it can also be readily
applied to the game with linear payoff where the master
equation has long-range hopping.
Although the MG is well understood from the classic
works discussed above, it is our hope that the simplified
model of the steady state attendance and score distribu-
tions presented in this paper provides an alternative and
readily accessible perspective on this fascinating model.
II. DEFINITION OF THE GAME AND
OUTLINE
In order to give an overview of our results and for com-
pleteness we start by providing the formal definition of
the Minority Game and some basic properties [2, 9, 10].
At each discrete time step every agent gives a binary
bid ai(t) = ±1, all of which are collected into a total
attendance
At =
N∑
i=1
ai(t) = −N, ..., N , (1)
(N odd) and the winning minority group is then identi-
fied through −sign(At). A binary string of the m past
winning bids, called a history µ, is provided as global in-
formation to each agent upon which to base her decision
for the following round. There are thus µ = 1, ..., P with
P = 2m different histories. At her disposal each agent
has two randomly assigned strategies (a.k.a. strategy ta-
bles) that provide a unique bid for each history. The bid
of strategy j = 1, 2 of agent i = 1, .., N in response to
history µ is given by aµi,j = ±1 and the full strategy is
the P dimensional random binary vector ~ai,j . There are
thus a total of 2P distinct strategies available.
The agent uses at each time step the strategy that
has made the best predictions for minority group his-
torically. This is decided by a score Ui,j(t) for each
strategy which is updated according to Ui,j(t + 1) =
Ui,j(t) − aµi,jsign(Aµt ), irrespectively of the strategy ac-
tually being used or not. (Here the superscript µ on At
t
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FIG. 1: Evolution of strategy scores for the two strategies of
four (i = 1, ...4) representative agents in a game with N = 101
agents and a memory of length m = 7 (P = 27). At each time
step every agent uses the one of her two strategies which has
the highest momentary score, given by how well the strategy
has predicted the past minority groups. The corresponding
score difference xi(t) (inset) shows the distinction between
frozen agents that consistently use a single strategy, and fickle
agents that switch between strategies.
just indicates that the attendance will depend on the his-
tory µ(t) giving the bids at time t.) Ties, i.e. Ui,1 = Ui,2,
are decided by a coin toss.
Since it is only the relative score between an agent’s
two strategies that is important in deciding which strat-
egy to use, one may focus on the relative score
xi(t) = (Ui,1(t)− Ui,2(t))/2 . (2)
This is updated according to
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) + ∆i(t) , (3)
where
∆i(t) = −ξµi sign(Aµt ) . (4)
and where ~ξi = (~ai,1 − ~ai,2)/2 is an agents “difference
vector” that takes values ±1 or 0 for each history µ.
To make the dynamics generated by these equations
more concrete, Figure 1 shows the scores of the strategies
of four particular agents Ui,1/2, i = 1, . . . , 4 for one real-
ization of a game with N = 101, P = 27, together with
the corresponding relative scores xi (inset), over a limited
time interval. As exemplified by this figure agents come
in two flavors, known as ”frozen” and ”fickle” [4, 13]. An
agent is frozen if one of her strategies performs consis-
tently better than the other, such that on average the
score difference is diverging, whereas fickle agents have
a relative score that meanders around x = 0 switching
their used strategy. The motion of xi for both fickle and
frozen agents is a random walk with a bias towards or
3away from x = 0. A basic problem is to characterize and
understand this random walk and derive the correspond-
ing probability distribution Pi(x, t); the probability to
find agent i at position x at time t [9, 15].
A. Outline and results
As presented in Section III we can quantify the cor-
relation between an agent’s strategies, specified by ξµi ,
and the total attendance Aµt , which in turn allows for
characterizing the mean (time averaged) step size ∆i =
〈xi(t + 1) − xi(t)〉 in terms of a distribution over agents
P (∆i). In agreement with earlier work we find that ∆i
has two contributions; one center (x = 0) seeking bias
term which arises from self interaction (the used strategy
contributes to the attendance and as such is more likely
to be in the majority group [16]) and a fitness term which
reflects the relative adaptation of the agent’s two strate-
gies to the time averaged stochastic environment of the
game. The distribution of step sizes over the population
of agents are shown in Figure 3 where frozen agents are
simply those where the fitness overcomes the bias, such
that ∆i > 0 for x > 0 or ∆i < 0 for x < 0, whereas for
fickle agents ∆i < 0 for x > 0 and vice versa.
Knowing the mean step size of an agent allows for a
formulation in terms of a one dimensional random walk
(Fig. 4) with corresponding jump probabilities, as pre-
sented in Section IV. Depending on whether it is more
likely to jump towards the center or not (fickle or frozen
respectively) the master equation on the chain can be
solved in terms of a stationary exponential distribution
centered at x = 0 or (in the continuum limit) a normal
distribution with a variance and mean that grow linearly
in time (diffusion with drift). These are the distributions
Pi(x, t) depending on ∆i.
In simulations over many agents it is natural to con-
sider the full distribution P (x, t) =
∑N
i=1 Pi(x, t)/N =∫
P (∆i)Pi(x, t)d∆i, with NP (x, t) thus the probability
of finding an agent at time t with relative score x. In
terms of scaled coordinates x/
√
N and t/N we find that
the distribution only depends on α. The model distri-
butions show excellent agreement with direct numerical
simulations (Fig. 5 and 6) with no fitting parameters.
This result for the full distribution of relative scores to-
gether with its systematic derivation for the original sign-
payoff game represent the main results of this paper.
In Appendix B we discuss the relation between the
model presented in this work and the formulation in
terms of a minimization problem of a Hamiltonian gen-
erator of the asymptotic dynamics [7, 12]. We find that
one way to view the present model is as a reduced ansatz
for the ground state where the only parameters are the
fraction of positively and negatively frozen agents (solved
for self-consistently) instead of the full space of the fre-
quency of use of each strategy. With this ansatz closed
expressions can be derived for the steady state distribu-
tions irrespective of the form of the Hamiltonian.
In Appendix C we show how the model applies to the
game with linear payoff ∆i(t) = −ξµi Aµt .
III. STATISTICAL MODEL
We will now turn to describing the statistical model
in some detail and derive the results discussed in the
previous section. We define for each agent the sum and
difference of strategies for each bid ~ωi = (~ai,1+~ai,2)/2 and
(as discussed above) ~ξi = (~ai,1 − ~ai,2)/2 [4]. Clearly ωµi ,
being the sum of two random numbers ±1 is distributed
over (−1, 0, 1) with probability (1/4, 1/2, 1/4). A non-
zero value of ωµi means that agent i always has the same
bid for history µ independently of which strategy it has
in play. The sum over all agents, ~Ω =
∑N
i=1 ~ωi, thus
gives a constant history dependent but time independent
background contribution to the attendance. (In the sense
that every time history µ occurs in the time series it gives
the same contribution.) This background Ωµ is, for large
N , normally distributed with mean zero and variance
σ2Ω = N/2 .
An interesting property of the Minority Game is that
there is a “Z2 gauge” freedom with respect to an arbi-
trary choice of which is called strategy 1 and which is 2,
thus corresponding to a change of sign of ~ξi. Such a sign
change will simply result in a change of sign of xi(t) hav-
ing no consequence on which strategy is actually in play.
(It is the strategy in play which is an observable, not
whether it is labeled by 1 or 2.) Nevertheless, it turns
out that making a consistent definition of the order of
strategies is helpful in formulating a simple statistical
model. Explicitly we order the two strategies (“fix the
gauge”) of all agents i such that
~ξi · ~Ω ≤ 0 . (5)
Shortly we will describe the distribution over agents of
ξµi , to quantify its anticorrelation with Ω
µ
i .
To proceed we write the attendance at a time step t
with history µ as
Aµt = Ω
µ +
∑
i
ξµi si(t) , (6)
where si(t) = ±1 depending on which strategy agent i
is playing [4]. Again, the relative strategy score xi of
agent i is updated according to Eqn. 4. Given the back-
ground contribution to the attendance ~Ω we expect there
to be a surplus of si = 1 in the steady state with our
choice of gauge because the strategy 1 is expected to be
favored by the score update function. (In other words,
strategy 1 is expected to have a higher fitness.) How-
ever, this correlation is not trivial as the accumulated
score also depends on the dynamically generated con-
tribution the attendance. As discussed previously some
fraction φ of the agents are frozen, in the sense of always
4using the same strategy, si = constant. We make an
additional distinction (made significant by our choice of
gauge) and separate the group of frozen agents into those
with si(t) = 1 (fraction φ1), and those with si(t) = −1
(fraction φ2), such that φ = φ1 + φ2. Clearly, we expect
the former to be more plentiful than the latter.
We will now derive steady state distributions over
agents for the mean step size ∆i. For this purpose we
will write the attendance as
Aµt = Ω
µ +Xµ + Y µ + St , (7)
where
Xµ =
∑
i∈φ1
ξµi (8)
Y µ = −
∑
i∈φ2
ξµi (9)
St =
∑
i fickle
ξµi si(t) , (10)
corresponding to the three categories of agents discussed
previously. We will make the following simplifying ap-
proximations for these three components: the fickle com-
ponent we will model as completely disordered, such that
si(t) = ±1 is random, and correspondingly (for large N)
St is normally distributed with mean zero and variance
σ2s = ϕN/2,
with ϕ = (1−φ1−φ2) the fraction of fickle agents. (Thus,
neglecting that the fickle agents would also have a net an-
ticorrelation with the background ~Ω). We will assume the
frozen agents to simply be a sum of independent random
variables drawn from the distribution of ~ξ, thus neglect-
ing that the agents that are frozen may come from the
extremes of this distribution.
To proceed, we need to find the distribution of ~ξi,
i.e. how it varies over the set of agents. (Henceforth
we will usually drop the index i and regard the ob-
jects as drawn from a distribution.) Begin by defining
~ψ = Random(±1)~ξ, which is thus disordered with re-
spect to the sign of ~Ω · ~ψ [22]. The object ψµ is inde-
pendent of Ωµ (ignoring 1/N corrections due to Ωµ 6= 0
limiting the available bids ±1), taking values (1, 0,−1)
with probability (1/4, 1/2, 1/4), which gives mean zero
and variance 1/2. Consider the joint object h = 1P
~Ω · ~ψ,
for large P this becomes normally distributed with mean
zero and variance σ2h =
1
P (N/2)(1/2) = 1/(4α) [4].
Now, to quantify the correlation between ~ξ and ~Ω we
define the object
h˜ =
1
P
~Ω · ~ξ = −|h|
which consequently has mean < h˜ >= − ∫ dhP (h)|h| =
−1/√2piα and < h˜2 >= σ2h. We will represent this dis-
tribution by assuming that each component ξµ are inde-
pendent Gaussian random variables with a mean that is
linearly dependent on Ωµ. With this assumption we find
the conditional distribution
Pξµ|Ωµ = Nξµ(−c(α)Ωµ/N, σξ) , (11)
where c(α) =
√
2
piα , and σ
2
ξ = 1/2, and where we write
the normal distribution over x with mean µ and variance
σ2 as Nx(µ, σ) = 1√2piσ e−(x−µ)
2/2σ2 . This quantifies that
ξµ is on average anticorrelated with Ωµ which is expected
to place strategy 1 in the minority group more often than
strategy 2.
Using Eqn. 11 we can also calculate the distributions
of Xµ (Y µ) as the sum of φ1N (φ2N) correlated objects
ξµi , giving
PXµ|Ωµ = NXµ(−c(α)φ1Ωµ, σX|Ω) (12)
PY µ|Ωµ = NY µ(c(α)φ2Ωµ, σY |Ω) , (13)
with conditional variances σ2X|Ω = φ1N/2 and σ
2
Y |Ω =
φ2N/2.
A. Distribution of step sizes
Given the model expressions for the distributions of all
the components of the score update equation (Eqn 4) we
will find the distribution of mean (time averaged) step
sizes. As a first step we integrate out the fast variable St
to get a conditional on µ time averaged step size ∆µ =
〈∆(t)|µ〉. (Over a long time series of the game every
history µ will occur many times, we thus average over all
those occurrences of a single history.) This corresponds
to
∆µ = −ξµ
∫
dSP (S)[sign(Ωµ +Xµ + Y µ + S)
+ sign(x)ξµδ(
1
2
(Ωµ +Xµ + Y µ + S))] . (14)
The second term, which is a self-interaction, follows from
the discrete nature of the original problem. It gives a
negative bias for the used strategy coming from the fact
that if the net attendance from all other agents is zero,
the used strategy puts the agent in the majority group.
(The factor 12 in the delta function is to account for the
fact that the attendance, as defined in Eqn 1, changes
in steps of two and the factor sign(x)ξµ comes from the
fact that only the used strategy enters the attendance.)
Integrated this gives
∆µ = ∆µfit + ∆
µ
bias
= −ξµerf(Ω
µ +Xµ + Y µ√
2σS
)
−sign(x)(ξµ)2
√
2
pi
1
σS
e−(Ω
µ+Xµ+Y µ)2/2σ2S ,(15)
where we have identified the first term as a fitness ∆fit
which quantifies the relative fitness of the agent’s two
5strategies and the second as a negative bias ∆bias for the
used strategy as discussed previously.
To calculate the distribution of mean step sizes we will
assume that histories occur with the same frequency such
that ∆ = 1P
∑
µ ∆
µ. This is in fact not the case for a
single realization of the game in the dilute phase, some
histories occur more often than others, as one can see di-
rectly from any simulation in this regime. Nevertheless,
for large P we will assume that this variation of occur-
rences of µ averages out. As discussed extensively in the
literature the overall behavior of the game is insensitive
to whether the actual history is used (endogenous infor-
mation) as input to the agents or if a random history is
supplied (exogenous information) [9, 10, 15, 20, 21]. This
is also confirmed by the present work through the good
agreement between the model using exogenous informa-
tion and simulations in which we use the actual history.
Assuming large P and given the assumption of inde-
pendence of the distributions Ω, ξ,X, Y for different µ we
expect the distribution P (∆) to approach a Gaussian (by
the central limit theorem) with mean
∆¯ =
∫
dΩdξdXdY PΩPξ|ΩPX|ΩPY |Ω∆µ , (16)
with ∆µ as in eqn 15, and with variance σ2 = 1P (∆
2 −
∆¯2).
The integrals are readily done analytically as described
in the appendix A, but the expressions are very lengthy.
The main features can be expressed in the following form:
∆¯bias = −sign(x) 1√
N
∆˜bias(α, φ1, φ2)
∆¯fit =
1√
αN
∆˜fit(α, φ1, φ2) , (17)
where ∆˜bias/fit > 0 are functions that only depend on N
and P through α = P/N , change slowly as a function of
the arguments in the physically relevant regime 0 ≤ φ1 +
φ2 ≤ 1 (Fig. 7) and which satisfy ∆˜bias(α, 0, 0) = 1√2pi
and ∆˜fit(α, 0, 0) =
1
pi . As seen from Eqn. 17, the mean
bias is towards x = 0, the used strategy is penalized,
while the mean fitness is positive acting to increase the
relative score x, consistent with our choice of gauge as
discussed earlier.
The only appreciable contribution to the variance
comes from the fitness term scaling as 1/P whereas the
bias has a variance that scales with 1/(NP ) and thus
negligible (as is the cross term). The variance can be
written
σ2bias = 0 (18)
σ2fit =
1
αN
σ˜2(α, φ1, φ2) , (19)
where σ˜ > 0 also changes slowly in the relevant regime
(Fig. 7) and satisfies σ˜(α, 0, 0) = 1√
6
. The width of the
fitness distribution explains the fact that even though
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FIG. 2: The fraction of frozen agents as a function of α = P/N
from the statistical model (Eqns. 21 and 22) compared to
results from direct numerical simulations of the game. The
frozen agents are divided into two groups φ1 and φ2 depend-
ing on if they are frozen with relative score x > 0 or x < 0
respectively. The fact that φ1 > φ2 follows from our con-
vention ~ξi · ~Ω ≤ 0 (eqn 5). Also shown is the total fraction
of frozen agents from the replica calculation for linear payoff
(Eqns. 3.41-3.44 of [9]). (Each data point is averaged over 20
runs with ∼ 1e6 time steps each (1e5 steps for N = 2001).)
∆¯fit > 0 consistent with φ1 6= 0, there are also some
agents with a large negative fitness which implies φ2 6= 0.
The fact that ~ξ · ~Ω < 0 thus does not necessarily imply
that strategy 1 is more successful than strategy 2 as the
correlation with the other frozen agents is also an im-
portant factor. For large α, both the mean and variance
of the fitness vanish, as can be understood as a result
of there being too few agents compared to the number
of possible outcomes to maintain any appreciable cor-
relation between an agents strategies and the aggregate
background, ~ξ·~Ω ≈ 0. In this limit, since the bias term al-
ways penalizes the used strategy there can be no frozen
agents. We also see that both the mean and width of
the distribution for given α scales with 1/
√
N , consistent
with simulations (Fig. 3).
B. Fraction of frozen agents
For each agent the score difference xi moves with a
mean step per unit time of
∆+ = ∆fit − |∆¯bias| for x > 0
∆− = ∆fit + |∆¯bias| for x < 0 , (20)
where ∆fit is drawn from the distribution N (∆¯fit, σfit).
If the fitness is high, such that ∆+ > 0, the agent will
6have a net positive movement and the agent is frozen,
with xi > 0 and growing unbounded. The fraction of
positive frozen agents is given by
φ1 =
∫ ∞
|∆¯bias|
dzNz(∆¯fit, σfit)
=
1
2
+
1
2
erf[
√
α
2
(
∆˜fit/
√
α− |∆˜bias|
σ˜
)] . (21)
Similarly, if the fitness is relatively very poor, such that
∆− < 0 the agent is frozen (with xi < 0) with magnitude
growing unbounded. The fraction of negatively frozen
agents is given by
φ2 =
∫ −|∆¯bias|
−∞
dzNz(∆¯fit, σfit)
=
1
2
− 1
2
erf[
√
α
2
(
∆˜fit/
√
α+ |∆˜bias|
σ˜
)] , (22)
and correspondingly the complete fraction of frozen
agents φ = φ1 +φ2 and fickle agents ϕ = 1−φ are found.
Since ∆˜fit, ∆˜bias, and σ˜ are functions of α, φ1, and φ2,
the two equations allow for solving for φ1(α) and φ2(α)
as a function of the only parameter α. We find that the
solutions are readily found by forward iteration, and the
results are plotted and compared to direct simulations
of the game in Figure 2 [23]. The fit is good, but there
is no indication of a phase transition for small α in this
simplified model.
From simulations we can also measure the distribu-
tion of mean step sizes to compare to the model, which
is shown in Figure 3. There we show an intermediate
value of α, the fit in terms of mean and width is not
as good close to αc and almost perfect for large α, but
everywhere the data seems well represented by a normal
distribution. We also use the mean step size distribu-
tions from simulations to calculate the fraction of frozen
agents, Figure 2. (The naive way to distinguish between
frozen and switching agents; to introduce a cut-off xcut
at some time t, with any agents with |xt| > xcut con-
sidered frozen, makes it difficult to distinguish between
frozen and switching agents with ∆ near 0.)
IV. DISTRIBUTIONS OVER x
We now use the fact that each agent is characterized
by an average step size per unit time, specified by the fit-
ness ∆fit, to describe the movement of the relative score
x on the set of integers. Consider that the agent at time
step t has score difference x, what is the probability that
at time t + 1 the score difference is x′? In each time
step, x can only change by −1, 0, 1 as given by the ba-
sic score update equation 4. We specify the respective
probabilities p−, p0, p+ with p− + p0 + p+ = 1 for x > 0
and q−, q0, q+ for x < 0. The mean probability that x
remains unchanged is p0 = q0 =
1
2 as this corresponds to
ξµi = 0, meaning that the agent’s two strategies have the
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FIG. 3: Distributions for mean step per unit time ∆ = 〈x(t+
1) − x(t)〉 at α ≈ 4 for x > 0 (top) and x < 0 (bottom),
comparing direct simulations of the game to the statistical
model (Eqn. 20). The fraction of frozen agents with x > 0
(φ1) is indicated by ”fr,+” and similarly for x < 0 (φ2). The
distributions of step sizes are different for x > 0 and x < 0
because of the convention ~ξi · ~Ω ≤ 0 as explained in Fig. 2.
(Simulations averaged over 1e6 time steps, excluding a 1e4
equilibration time.)
same bid which on average (over µ) will be the case for
half of the histories. It should also be clear that the step-
ping probabilities cannot depend on the magnitude of x,
only the sign, because the difference in score between
strategies does not enter the game, only which strategy
is currently used. The case x = 0 has to be treated sep-
arately; we toss a coin to decide which strategy is used,
thus the probability for a +1 increment is (p+ + q+)/2
and for a −1 increment is (p−+q−)/2. The movement of
x thus corresponds to a one-dimensional random walk on
a chain, with asymmetric jump probabilities, as sketched
in Figure 4.
To relate the probabilities to the mean step size we
note that for x > 0, ∆+ = 1 · p+ + 0 · p0 − 1 · p−, which
together with the conservation of probability and the fact
that p0 = 1/2 gives
p± =
1
4
± ∆
+
2
(23)
q± =
1
4
± ∆
−
2
, (24)
where results for q follow from the same analysis for x <
0. Keeping in mind that for a fickle agent ∆+ < 0 and
7. . .  1 0 1 . . .
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FIG. 4: The movement of the relative strategy score x of an
agent is described by a random walk on a chain with jump
probabilities p+, p−, p0 for x > 1 (i.e. strategy 1 in play)
and q+, q−, q0 for x < −1 (i.e. strategy 2 in play). At the
boundary x = −1, 0, 1 due to the coin toss choice of strategy
the probabilities are altered as in the figure.
∆− > 0 this is of course consistent with p+ < p− and
q− < q+. A frozen agent is instead given by p+ > p− or
q− > q+.
With the known probabilities we can write down a
master equation on the chain for the probability distri-
bution Px(t) (implicit ∆fit dependence)
Px(t+ 1) = p0Px(t) + p+Px−1(t) + p−Px+1(t), x > 1
Px(t+ 1) = q0Px(t) + q+Px−1(t) + q−Px+1(t), x < 1 ,
(25)
and at the boundary
P1(t+ 1) = p0P1(t) +
1
2
(p+ + q+)P0(t) + p−P2(t),
P0(t+ 1) =
1
2
(q0 + p0)P0(t) + q+P−1(t) + p−P1(t),
P−1(t+ 1) = q0P−1(t) + q+P−2(t) +
1
2
(p+ + q−)P0(t) .
(26)
Assuming that the distribution is stationary, such that
Px(t) = Px, and concentrating on x > 0, we find after
some manipulations the equation
p−
p+
− Px−1
Px
=
p−
p+
Px+1
Px
− 1
which has the exponential solution
Px ∼ (p−
p+
)−x = e−x ln
p−
p+ ≈ e4x∆+ , x > 1 . (27)
In the last step we used equation 23 and the fact that
from equation 17 the mean step size is small such that
|∆+| ∼ 1/√N  1. From this we can identify a de-
cay length x+ = 1/(4|∆+|) ∼
√
N , which characterizes
the range of positive excursions of the score difference of
the fickle agent. Clearly, this solution requires p− > p+
(∆+ < 0) to be bounded, as is the case for fickle agents.
From the same analysis for x < 1 the fickle agents with
q− < q+ have the distribution Px ∼ ex ln
q+
q− ≈ e4x∆− .
What remains is to match up the solutions for positive
and negative x at the interface. This can be solved ex-
actly, but given that the exponential prefactor is small
we settle for the approximate expression
Px ≈ e−4|∆+|xP0, x ≥ 0
Px ≈ e4∆−xP0, x ≤ 0
P0 ≈ 4|∆+|−1 + (∆−)−1 . (28)
From this expression we see that the distribution is asym-
metric, such that given that on average |∆+| < ∆−
agents are more likely to be found with x > 0. This
opens up for a more sophisticated modelling (left for fu-
ture work) where this aspect is fed back into the initial
statistical description of the sum of fickle agents through
the dynamical variable St, the total attendance of the
fickle agents, acquiring a mean depending on µ.
For the frozen agents the master equation is the same,
but given p+ > p− (or q− > q+) we expect a drift of the
mean of the distribution. Thus focusing on long times
we can consider one or the other of Eqs. 25 depending
on whether the agent is frozen with x > 0 or x < 0. For
x > 0 and assuming that the agent at time t = 0 is at site
x = 0 (neglecting the influence any excursions to x < 0)
we can write down an exact expression for Px(t) in terms
of a multinomial distribution. Alternatively, and simpler,
we can take the continuum limit Px(t+1) = P (x, t)+
dP
dt
and Px±1(t) = P (x, t) ± dPdx + 12 d
2P
dx2 to find the Fokker-
Planck equation
∂P
∂t
= −(p+ − p−)∂P
∂x
+
1
2
(p+ + p−)
∂2P
∂x2
. (29)
Given the initial condition P (x, 0) = δ(x) this has the
solution P (x, t) = Nx(x¯, σt) with x¯ = (p+ − p−)t = ∆+t
and σ2t = (p+ + p−)t =
1
2 t, thus describing diffusion with
a drift.
A. Full score distributions
Given that we now have a description of the relative
score distribution of a single agent in terms of an asym-
metric exponential decay or diffusion, we can also con-
sider the full distribution of relative scores over all agents,
by integrating over the distribution of mean step sizes.
Defining the scaled variables x˜ = x/
√
N and t˜ = t/N
we write P (x˜, t˜) = Pfi(x˜) + Pfr,+(x˜, t˜) + Pfr,−(x˜, t˜), cor-
responding to the stationary distribution of the fickle
agents and diffusive distributions of the frozen agents
with x > 0 and x < 0 respectively. The first compo-
nent is
Pfi(x˜) =
∫ bα
−bα
dzNz( ∆˜fit√α , σ˜√α ) 4e4(z±bα)x˜
(bα − z)−1 + (bα + z)−1 , (30)
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FIG. 5: Full scaled distribution Px˜ with x˜ = x/
√
N over
all agents for α ≈ 4 compiled by averaging simulations over
scaled time window t˜0 = t0/
√
N to t˜1 = t1/
√
N . The model
results (”fickle+frozen”) are Px˜ =
1
t˜1−t˜0
∫ t˜1
t˜0
dt˜P (x˜, t˜), using
Equations 30 and 31. Also shown are model results using
only fickle agents.
The following time windows are used: for N = 501, t0 =
5e5 to t1 = 5e6; for N = 1001, t = 2t0 to 2t1; for N =
2001, t = 4t0 to 4t1, which correspond to the same t˜0 and t˜1.
(Simulations are averaged over 80 runs for N = 501 and 15
runs for N = 1001 and 2001.)
where ± corresponds to x < 0 and x > 0 respectively,
and where bα = |∆˜bias|. For the frozen agents we have
Pfr,+(x˜, t˜) =
∫ ∞
bα
dzNz(∆˜fit√
α
,
σ˜√
α
)Nx˜(t˜(z − bα), σt˜)
Pfr,−(x˜, t˜) =
∫ −bα
−∞
dzNz(∆˜fit√
α
,
σ˜√
α
)Nx˜(t˜(z + bα), σt˜) ,
(31)
where σ2
t˜
= t˜/2. These expressions are compared to di-
rect simulations of the game for intermediate α ≈ 4 in
Fig. 5. The simulations are averaged over a specific time
window and the diffusive component Eqn. 31 is inte-
grated over the corresponding scaled time window. The
agreement is excellent over the complete stationary and
diffusive components of the distribution and shows the
data collapse in terms of scaled coordinates. In Fig. 6
we also show a comparison for large α ≈ 80 where the
simulations have no frozen agents and all fickle agents
are localized by a length close to the α → ∞ value
x0 =
√
piN/8.
The asymmetry of these plots is an artefact of our
gauge choice ~ξi · ~Ω ≤ 0 which implies that on average
agents will use strategy 1 (x > 0) more frequently than
strategy 2 (x < 0). To restore the full symmetry is sim-
ply a matter of symmetrizing the distributions around
x = 0.
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FIG. 6: Distribution Px˜ at large α ≈ 80. There are no frozen
agents, and the simulated and model (“fickle”) distributions
are stationary. Also shown is the asymptotic α→∞ behavior
where all agents are symmetrically localized with localization
length x0 =
√
piN/8, and a simulation at α ≈ 650 which
approaches this asymptotic behavior. (Simulations averaged
over ∼ 4e8 time steps.)
Finally, we remark that the formal solution in terms of
an exponential distribution of strategy scores for frozen
agents was derived in [12] from a Fokker-Planck equation
for the linear payoff game. See Appendix B and C for a
further discussion of the comparison between the present
model and the Hamiltonian formulation.
V. SUMMARY
We have studied the asymmetric phase of the basic
Minority Game, focusing on the statistical distribution
of relative strategy scores and the original sign-payoff
formulation of the game. We formulate a statistical
model for the attendance that relies on a specific gauge
choice in which the two strategies of each agent are
ordered with respect to the background (~ξi · ~Ω ≤ 0 for all
agents i). Using this model we can derive a distribution
of the mean step per time increment for the relative
scores, specified in terms of a bias for the used strategy
and the relative fitness of the two strategies. The relative
strategy score for each agent is conveniently described
as a random walk on an integer chain, where the jump
probabilities are calculated from the mean step. The
probability distribution of observing the agent at some
position on the chain at a given time is either given by
a static asymmetric exponential localized around x = 0
for fickle agents or to diffusion with a drift for frozen
agents. Excellent agreement with direct simulations of
the game for the score distribution confirms the basic
validity of the modelling. At the same time, as discussed
in the appendix, the fluctuations of the attendance are
9overestimated by the model. By contrasting with the
Hamiltonian formulation of the dynamics the reason
for this discrepancy is readily understood from viewing
the model as a crude ansatz for full minimization
problem. This also opens up for improving the model by
introducing some variational parameters without having
to confront the full complexity of the minimization of
a non-quadratic Hamiltonian for general payoff functions.
We thank Erik Werner for valuable discussions. Simu-
lations were performed on resources at Chalmers Centre
for Computational Science and Engineering (C3SE) pro-
vided by the Swedish National Infrastructure for Com-
puting (SNIC).
Appendix A: Solving for mean and variance of step
size.
The integrals to calculate the mean and variance for
the distribution of average step sizes, Eqn. 16, are Gaus-
sian integrals including the error function. To solve these
we first rescale the variables in terms of the variance
Ω/σΩ → Ω, X/σX|Ω → X etc. and perform the inte-
gral over the distribution of agents ξ which evaluates to
〈ξ|Ω〉 = −c(α)Ω/√2N (c(α) =
√
2
piα ) and 〈ξ2|Ω〉 = 12 .
We are left with integrals
∆¯bias = −sign(x) 1√
piNϕ
∫
dΩdXdY
(2pi)3/2
e−
1
2 [Ω
2+(X+
√
φ1c(α)Ω)
2+(Y−√φ2c(α)Ω)2]
e
− 12 (
Ω+
√
φ1X+
√
φ2Y√
ϕ )
2
, (A1)
∆¯fit =
c(α)√
2N
∫
dΩdXdY
(2pi)3/2
e−
1
2 [Ω
2+(X+
√
φ1c(α)Ω)
2+(Y−√φ2c(α)Ω)2]
Ω erf(
Ω +
√
φ1X +
√
φ2Y√
2ϕ
) , (A2)
and
σ2fit =
1
2P
∫
dΩdXdY
(2pi)3/2
e−
1
2 [Ω
2+(X+
√
φ1c(α)Ω)
2+(Y−√φ2c(α)Ω)2]
erf2(
Ω +
√
φ1X +
√
φ2Y√
2ϕ
) , (A3)
To evaluate these we use the following integral formulas∫
(
∏
i
dxi√
2pi
)e−
1
2x
TAx = 1/
√
det(A) , (A4)
∫
dx√
2pi
e−
x2
2 x erf(
bx√
2
+ c) =
√
2
pi
b√
1 + b2
e−c
2/(1+b2) ,
(A5)
and∫
dx√
2pi
e−
x2
2 erf2(
bx√
2
) =
4
pi
arctan
√
1 + 2b2 − 1 , (A6)
where A is a symmetric (positive definite) matrix, and
b and c are real constants. The bias term thus follows
from a direct application of the first integral formula to
a 3x3 matrix. The fitness term follows from a substi-
tution X ′ = X +
√
φ1c(α)Ω and Y
′ = Y − √φ2c(α)Ω
to apply the second integral formula over Ω and subse-
quently the first integral formula on a 2x2 matrix. The
variance can be calculated by the substitution for Ω,
z = Ω+
√
φ1X+
√
φ2Y , followed by integrating outX and
Y to finally apply the third integral formula over z. The
actual expressions are quite lengthy[24], but the impor-
tant features can be represented according to Eqs. 17 and
19 in terms of functions ∆˜bias(α, φ1, φ2), ∆˜fit(α, φ1, φ2),
and σ˜(α, φ1, φ2). After solving for for the fractions of
frozen agents φ1(α) and φ2(α) using Eqs. 21 and 22, we
can consider these functions as dependent only on the
control parameter α. The dependence on α is plotted in
Figure 7, to point out that these functions change little
over the whole relevant range α > αc ≈ 0.3.
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FIG. 7: The α parameter dependence of the three quantities
specifying the mean and variance of the distribution of mean
step sizes according to Equations 17 and 19.
Appendix B: Hamiltonian formulation
Here we connect the formalism in the present work to
the solution using the replica method, following closely
the presentation in [12] and [7]. Expressing the atten-
dance for given history in terms of fluctuations around a
mean as
Aµt = 〈A|µ〉+ St , (B1)
where St is a Gaussian random variable with mean zero
and variance σ2S (to be determined self-consistently).
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This is related to expression (7), where we take an ex-
plicit statistical form 〈A|µ〉 = Ωµ + Xµ + Y µ, assumed
to correspond to background plus frozen agents. Also, in
the model in this paper we have the magnitude of σ2S as
ϕN/2, with ϕ the fraction of fickle agents. This is not
assumed in the present treatise, but as we will see the
outcome is related.
There is also the explicit expression, Eqn. 6, for the
attendance Aµt = Ω
µ +
∑
i ξ
µ
i si(t), where si(t) = ±1
depending on which strategy is momentarily used by
the agent. Taking the time average of this and assum-
ing that the frequency of use is not influenced by the
rapid switches of history we write 〈si(t)〉 = mi, where
for frozen agents mi = ±1 and for fickle |mi| < 1. AS
discussed in [12] the fluctuations of si(t) are statistically
independent such that 〈si(t)sj(t)〉 = mimj for i 6= j,
whereas (si(t))
2 = 1 by definition. With this we can
write 〈A|µ〉 = Ωµ +∑i ξµi mi, noting that ∂〈A|µ〉∂mi = ξµi .
Now, evaluating the variance of the attendance using
Eqn. 6 and σ2Ω = N/2, we find
σ2 = 〈A2〉 = N
2
+
1
P
(2~Ω·~ξimi+
∑
i 6=j
~ξi·~ξjmimj+
∑
i
(~ξi)
2) .
This we can alternatively write (using Eqn. B1) as σ2 =
1
P
∑
µ〈A|µ〉2 + σ2S = H + σ2S . Here H, the predictability,
also has the alternative form (using Eqn. 6)
H =
N
2
+
1
P
(2~Ω · ~ξimi +
∑
ij
~ξi · ~ξjmimj) .
Correspondingly we find for the rapidly fluctuating field
St the variance
σ2S = σ
2 −H =
∑
i
1
2
(1−m2i )
(using σ2ξ = 1/2). The latter expression has no contri-
bution from frozen agents (as expected), and assuming
that the distribution of mi is quite strongly centred at 0
it will be close to, but always lower than, our assumed
value of ϕN/2.
Consider now the fixed history time averaged step size
for agent i, ∆µi = −ξµi 〈sign(At)|µ〉, with
〈sign(At)|µ〉 =
∫
dSP (S)sign(〈A|µ〉+ S).
The aim is to find a Hamiltonian generator H of the long
time dynamics such that the time and history averaged
update is given by
∆¯i =
1
P
∑
µ
ξµi 〈sign(A)|µ〉 = −
∂H
∂mi
.
(Note that this expression is not equivalent to Eqn. 16).
The latter is the mean of a distribution, whereas the
present object represents the full distribution of average
step sizes over agents corresponding to different i.) A
function that does this is H = ∫ dSP (S)G(〈A|µ〉 + S)
where G(x) = x sign(x) such that dGdx = sign(x), which
evaluates to
H = 1
P
∑
µ
(〈A|µ〉erf( 〈A|µ〉√
2σS
) +
√
2
pi
σSe
−(〈A|µ〉)2/2σ2s ) .
(B2)
Thinking of the long-time evolution of the score differ-
ence for agent xi which has an average step size ∆¯i, we
find that if ∆¯i > 0 the agent will be frozen positive, with
mi = 1 and similarly if ∆¯i < 0 it will be frozen negative,
with mi = −1. Only if ∆¯i = 0 the agent will be fickle,
with −1 < mi < 1. Considering that ∆¯i = − ∂H∂mi we
find the three cases: m1 = 1 corresponds to
∂H
∂mi
< 0,
m1 = −1 corresponds to ∂H∂mi > 0, and −1 < mi < 1
corresponds to ∂H∂mi = 0. The solution to this thus cor-
responds to finding the minimum of H with respect to
{mi}.
The minimization of Eqn. B2 however, looks like a
formidable problem in the thermodynamic limit, and we
are not aware that it has been pursued in the litera-
ture. (Note that 〈A|µ〉 ∼ √N ∼ σS such that an ex-
pansion is not appropriate.) This is in contrast to the
case of linear payoff (se Appendix C) where Hlinear =
H = 1P
∑
µ〈A|µ〉2 which is a quadratic form in the vari-
ables mi. For the latter case the minimization problem
has been solved using the replica method [7, 16, 17]. The
equilibrium score distributions that we focus on in the
present work have been solved for in [12] but to the best
of our knowledge not for the sign-payoff game. Also, it
appears that these distributions have not been discussed
or studied in any detail, or compared to simulations, in
earlier work.
Appendix C: Distributions with linear payoff
Here we repeat the analysis of the main paper for the
case of linear payoff where Eqn. 4 is replaced by
∆i(t) = −ξµi Aµt . (C1)
We apply the same distributions, Eqs. 11-13, for the
relative bid ξµ, the contribution to the attendance of the
positively (x > 0) frozen agents Xµ, and the negatively
(x < 0) frozen agents Y µ and write Aµt = Ω
µ + Xµ +
Y µ + St (Eqn. 7). Here Ω
µ is the background (mean
zero, variance N/2) and St is the contribution from the
fickle agents (with assumed mean zero). Integrating over
time at fixed history µ, St integrates to zero because of
linearity, giving
∆µ = ∆µfit + ∆
µ
bias
= −ξµ(Ωµ +Xµ + Y µ)− sign(x)(ξµ)2 , (C2)
where we have explicitly inserted the negative bias term
for the used strategy. Averaging over histories in the
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large P limit we find that the bias is just a constant
∆bias = −sign(x)1
2
, (C3)
and the fitness is normal with mean and variance given
by
∆¯fit =
c
2
(1− cφ1 + cφ2) (C4)
σ2fit =
1
4α
[(1− cφ1 + cφ2)2 + φ1 + φ2] , (C5)
where as before c = c(α) =
√
2/piα and φ1 and φ2 are the
respective fractions of frozen agents. We note that the
step size is of order 1 for the linear payoff, compared to
order 1/
√
N for the sign payoff game. Similarly in both
cases, for large α the fitness drops out, ensuring that
there are no frozen agents. For moderate α the fraction
of frozen agents need to be solved for self-consistently
through the equations
φ1 =
∫ ∞
1/2
dzNz(∆¯fit, σfit) = 1
2
erfc(
1
2 − ∆¯fit√
2σfit
)
φ2 =
∫ −1/2
−∞
dzNz(∆¯fit, σfit) = 1
2
erfc(
1
2 + ∆¯fit√
2σfit
) .
As for the sign-payoff game the results from solving these
equations numerically are in good agreement with simu-
lation data in the dilute phase as shown in Fig. 8. (Note,
compared to Fig. 2, that both the data and model re-
sults for the fraction of frozen agents are very similar and
quite insensitive to whether sign-payoff or linear payoff
is used.)

100 101
fra
cti
on
 o
f f
ro
ze
n 
ag
en
ts
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Frozen with x > 0
Frozen with x < 0
All frozen
N = 101
N = 201
N = 401
N = 801
N=2001
Replica method
Model
FIG. 8: The fraction of frozen agents as a function of α for
linear payoff. Also shown is the total fraction of frozen agents
from the replica calculation (Eqns. 3.41-3.44 of [9]) (Each
data point is averaged over 20 runs with ∼ 1e6 time steps
each (1e5 steps for N = 2001).)
The fluctuations of attendance σ2 = 〈A2〉 = H+ϕN/2
with H = 1P
∑
µ〈A|µ〉2 = N2 (1 − c(φ1 − φ2)))2 are com-
pared to simulations in Fig. 9. These are clearly signif-
icantly overestimated by the model. (Similar results are
found for the sign-payoff game and model.) Following the
exposition in appendix B, the reasons for this discrep-
ancy is quite clear. The model always overestimates the
fluctuations St, and since we are assuming that only the
frozen agents contribute to 〈A|µ〉 we also miss the contri-
bution of the fickle agents to reduce H. There seems to
be a quite clear path to improve the model along these
lines, which is left for future work. Here we opt for the
simplicity of solving the present model and the fact that
it does give quantitative agreement with distribution of
realtive strategy scores.
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FIG. 9: Model and simulation results for σ2 and H for the
linear payoff game. (Each point is averaged over 10 runs with
107 time steps each).
As a next step we can find the score distributions by
solving the master equation on an integer chain. In con-
trast to the t game where scores are only updated by 0 or
±1, we now have to consider longer range hopping where
scores are updated by integer steps in the range −N to
N . Taking into account the individual time averaged step
size ∆± = ∆fit∓ 12 (for x > 0 and x < 0 respectively) and
the fact that ξµ(t)At has variance N/2, we expect that
the jump propabilities are well represented by a normal
distribution (for a jump from x to x′)
px→x′ = N(x′−x)(∆±,
√
N
2
) . (C6)
The master equation takes the form
Px(t+ 1) =
∑
x′
px′→xPx′(t) . (C7)
Taking the continuum limit over space and ignoring com-
plications due to the boundary x = 0, this can be solved
in terms of exponential localization for fickle agents
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(∆+ < 0 and ∆− > 0) and diffusion with a drift for
frozen agents (∆+ > 0 or ∆− < 0). For fickle agents the
score distributions are given by
P (x) ∼ e∓4|∆±|x/N (C8)
for x > 0 and x < 0 respectively, which in the large α
limit reduces to P (x) ∼ e∓2x/N . For frozen agents the
distributions are given by
P (x, t) = Nx(∆±t,
√
Nt
2
) , (C9)
for positively and negatively frozen agents respectively.
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